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Winners and Losers in Housing Markets 
 





This paper is a quantitatively-oriented theoretical study of the interaction between housing 
prices, aggregate production, and household behavior over a lifetime. We develop a life-
cycle model of a production economy in which land and capital are used to build residential 
and commercial real estates. We find that, in an economy where the share of land in the 
value of real estates is large, housing prices react more to an exogenous change in expected 
productivity or the world interest rate, causing a large redistribution between net buyers 
and net sellers of houses. Changing financing constraints, however, has limited effects on 
housing prices. 
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 1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, we have observed considerable ￿ uctuations in real estate values
and aggregate economic activities in many economies. In Japan, both the real capital gains
on real estate during the prosperous decade of the 1980s and the losses during the depressed
decades of the 1990s and the early 2000s are in the order of multiple years worth of GDP.
Recent ￿ uctuations in housing prices in many countries raise concerns. To what extent
are these housing price ￿ uctuations consistent with fundamental conditions? How do the
￿ uctuations a⁄ect the wealth and welfare of di⁄erent groups of households? In this paper,
we develop a life-cycle model to investigate how housing prices, aggregate production and the
wealth distribution react to changes in technology and ￿nancial conditions. After con￿rming
that the model is broadly empirically consistent with life-cycle choices of home ownership
and consumption, we use the model to assess which groups of households gain and which
groups lose from changes in fundamentals.
To develop a theoretical framework, we take into account the limitation on the supply of
land and the limitation on the enforcement of contracts in real estate and credit markets.
Land (or location) is an important input for supplying residential and commercial real estates.
Because the supply of land is largely inelastic and because the real estate price includes the
value of land, the real estate price is sensitive to a change in the expected productivity
growth rate and the real interest rate in equilibrium. We also consider incomplete contract
enforcement to be an essential feature of an economy with real estate. Often, because
landlords are afraid that the tenant may modify the property against their interests, landlords
restrict tenants￿discretion over the use and modi￿cation of the house, and tenants enjoy
lower utility from renting the house compared to owning and controlling the same house. If
there were no other frictions, then the household would buy the house straight away. The
household, however, may face a ￿nancing constraint, because the creditor fears that the
borrowing household may default. The creditor demands the borrower to put his house as
collateral for a loan and asks him to provide a downpayment. We develop an overlapping
generations model of a production economy in which land and capital are used to produce
residential and commercial tangible assets, taking the importance of land for production
1of tangible assets, the loss of utility from rented housing and the tightness of collateral
constraints as exogenous parameters.1
The interaction between the collateral constraint and the loss of utility from renting a
house turns out to generate a typical pattern of consumption and housing over a life-cycle.
When the household is born without any inheritance, it cannot a⁄ord a su¢ ciently high
downpayment for buying a house; the household rents and consumes modestly to save for
a downpayment. When the household accumulates some net worth, the household buys a
house subject to the collateral constraint, which is smaller than a house that would be bought
without the collateral constraint. As net worth further rises, the household upgrades along
the housing ladder. At some stage, the household ￿nds it better to start repaying the debt
rather than moving up the housing ladder. When the time comes for retirement possibly
with idiosyncratic risk attached, the household moves to a smaller house anticipating a lower
income in the future.
In equilibrium, due to the limitation of land supply, the supply of tangible assets tends
to grow more slowly than ￿nal output causing an upward trend in the real rental price and
the purchase price of the tangible asset. The more important is land for producing tangible
assets compared to capital (as in Japan or a metropolitan area), the higher is the expected
growth rate of the rental price and therefore the higher is the housing price-rental ratio. In
such an economy, the household needs a larger downpayment relative to wage income in order
to buy a house and tends to buy a house later in life, resulting in a lower home-ownership
rate.
Moreover, in an economy where land is more important for producing tangible assets,
we ￿nd the housing price to be more sensitive to exogenous changes in fundamentals such
as the expected growth rate of labor productivity or the world interest rate, along the
perfect foresight path from one steady state to another. Consistent with these theoretical
predictions, Davis and Heathcote (2007) note that housing prices are more sensitive in large
U.S. metropolitan areas. Del Negro and Otrok (2007) use a dynamic factor decomposition
to ￿nd that local factors are more important for the house price change in states where the
1Here, the importance of land for the production of the tangible asset is de￿ned as the elasticity of tangible
asset supply with respect to land for a ￿xed level of the other input. See equation (2) later on.
2share of land in the real estate value is larger in the United States.2
In contrast to the change in productivity growth and the world interest rate, we ￿nd that
￿nancial innovation which permanently relaxes the collateral constraint has a surprisingly
small e⁄ect on housing prices, despite increasing the home-ownership rate substantially both
in the transition and in the steady state. In our economy, tenants or credit-constrained
home owners are relatively poor and own a small share of aggregate wealth as a group. As
a result, the e⁄ect of relaxing the collateral constraint on housing prices is largely absorbed
by a modest conversion from rented to owned units.
In addition to the e⁄ect on the housing price and aggregate output, the exogenous changes
in the productivity growth rate and the interest rate a⁄ect the wealth and welfare of various
households di⁄erently, causing winners and losers in housing markets. As a general rule of
thumb, net house buyers (such as young worker-tenants) lose and net house sellers (such as
retiree-home owners) gain from the house price hike, while the wealth e⁄ect of the house
price change on aggregate consumption is negligible aside from the liquidity e⁄ect.3 Since
housing wealth forms the largest component of nonhuman wealth for most households, the
2Davis and Palumbo (2008) ￿nd that the share of land in the value of houses has risen in U.S. metropolitan
areas and they argue that this contributes to faster housing price appreciation and, possibly, larger swings
in housing prices. Glaeser et. al. (2005) ￿nd that land use restrictions are needed to explain recent
high housing prices in Manhattan. van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2006) also argue that the increase in the
dispersion of housing prices across regions can be quantitatively generated from an increase in the dispersion
of earnings in the presence of planning restrictions. We ignore the restrictions on land use and planning,
even though they further increase the natural limitation of land in supplying tangible assets. Other factors
that might be empirically relevant for house price determination (such as owner-occupied housing as a hedge
against rent risk, the e⁄ects of in￿ ation and money illusion) are not considered in our framework; see Sinai
and Souleles (2005) and Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008).
3The household is a net house buyer if the expected present value of housing services consumption over
the lifetime exceeds the value of the house currently owned. Although the present population as a whole is
a net seller of the existing houses to the future population, the aggregate e⁄ect is quantitatively very small
because the discounted value of selling the existing houses to the future population is negligible. Thus,
unlike some popular arguments, the wealth e⁄ect of housing prices on aggregate consumption is negligible,
because the positive wealth e⁄ect of the net house sellers is largely o⁄set by the negative wealth e⁄ect of the
net house buyers of present population.
3distribution e⁄ect is substantial. The overall welfare e⁄ect depends on the underlying shocks
causing house price changes. A general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents
enables us to analyze how the shocks to fundamentals a⁄ect the distribution of wealth and
welfare of di⁄erent households.
Our work broadly follows two strands of the literature. One is the literature on con-
sumption and saving of a household facing idiosyncratic and uninsurable earnings shock and
a borrowing constraint, which includes Bewley (1977, 1983), Deaton (1991), Carroll (1997),
Attanasio et. al. (1999) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002). Huggett (1993), Aiyagari
(1994), and Krusell and Smith (1998) have examined the general equilibrium implications of
such models. The second strand is the literature on the investment behavior of ￿rms under
liquidity constraints. In particular, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) is closely related since they
study the dynamic interaction between asset prices, credit limits and aggregate economic
activity for an economy with credit constrained entrepreneurs. When many households
borrow substantially against their housing collateral and move up and down the housing
ladder, these households are more like small entrepreneurs rather than simple consumers.
Our attention to housing collateral is in line with substantial micro evidence in the
UK (Campbell and Cocco (2007)) and the US (Hurst and Sta⁄ord (2004)) which suggests
that dwellings are an important source of collateral for households. Given the empirical
￿ndings that connect housing prices, home equity and aggregate consumption, there has
been substantial research on building models that capture these relationships, either with
a representative agent (Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe (2004), Davis and Heathcote (2005),
Kahn (2007), Piazessi et. al. (2007)), or with heterogeneous agents (Chambers, Garriga and
Schlagenhauf (2009), Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007), Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello
and Neri (2007), Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005), Nakajima (2005), Ortalo-Magne and
Rady (2006), Rios-Rull and Sanchez (2005) and Silos (2007)). Distinguishing features of our
analysis include an explicit account of land as a limiting factor in a production economy,
an investigation of the interaction between household life-cycle choices and the aggregate
economy and evaluating welfare changes across heterogeneous households stemming from
shocks to fundamentals.
Section 2 lays out the model, Section 3 examines the steady state, and Section 4 investi-
4gates the transitions, including the impact on wealth and welfare of di⁄erent households.
2 The Model
2.1 Framework
We consider an economy with homogeneous product, tangible assets, labor, reproducible
capital stock, and non-reproducible land. There is a continuum of heterogeneous households
of population size Nt in period t, a representative foreigner, and a representative ￿rm.
The representative ￿rm has a constant returns to scale technology to produce output (Yt)
from labor (Nt) and productive tangible assets (ZY t) as:
Yt = F(AtNt;ZY t) = (AtNt)
1￿￿Z
￿
Y t; 0 < ￿ < 1; (1)
where At is aggregate labor productivity which grows at a constant rate, At+1=At = GA.
Tangible assets (Zt) are produced according to a constant returns to scale production function




t ; 0 < ￿ < 1: (2)
The tangible assets are fully equipped or furnished and can be used as productive tangible
assets (such as o¢ ces and factories) or houses interchangeably:




where ht(i) is housing used by household i in period t. With this technological speci￿cation
of tangible assets, the ￿rm can continuously adjust the way in which the entire stock of land
and capital are combined and can convert between productive tangible assets and housing
without any friction.4 The parameter (1 ￿ ￿) measures the importance of land for the
4Davis and Heathcote (2005) use a production function in which only a ￿xed ￿ ow of new vacant land can
be used for building new houses. Because, once used, the land is no longer usable for renovation nor new
construction, there would be no vibrant city older than a hundred years. Perhaps, in reality, the allocation
of land and capital is not as ￿ exible as in our model but not as in￿ exible as in Davis and Heathcote (2005).
5production of tangible assets compared to capital, which would be equal to the share of
land in property income if there were separate competitive rental markets for land and
capital. Thus, we often call (1 ￿ ￿) as "the share of land in the production of tangible
assets" hereafter. Typically, the share of land in the production of tangible assets is higher
in urban than in rural areas, because land (or location) is more important for production
with the agglomeration of economic activities.5 We assume that the aggregate supply of
land L is ￿xed. The capital stock depreciates at a constant rate 1￿￿ 2 (0;1) every period,
but can be accumulated through investment of goods (It) as:
Kt = ￿Kt￿1 + It: (4)
Tangible assets built this period can be used immediately.
The representative ￿rm owns and controls land and capital from last period and issues
equity to ￿nance investment. As the ￿rm increases the size of tangible assets with capital
accumulation, it will be convenient in subsequent analysis to assume that the ￿rm maintains
the number of shares to be equal to the stock of tangible assets.6 Let qt be the price of equity
before investment takes place and let pt be the price of equity after investment takes place
in this period. Let wt be the real wage rate, and rt be the rental price of tangible assets.
The ￿rm then faces the following ￿ ow-of-funds constraint:
Yt ￿ wtNt ￿ rtZY t ￿ It + ptZt = qtZt￿1 (5)
The left hand side (LHS) is the sum of the net cash ￿ ow from output production, minus
We also assume there is no productivity growth in the production of tangible assets, because Davis and
Heathcote (2005) calculate the growth rate of productivity in the US construction sector to be close to zero
(￿0:27 percent per annum). We ignore labor used in this sector for simplicity.
5We will not attempt to explain why agglomeration arises. We should not confuse the share of land
(1 ￿ ￿) with the scarcity of land (or marginal product of land), because scarcity not only depends upon the
share of land, but also on labor productivity, the capital-land ratio and the capital-labor ratio. We will later
discuss how the share of land in the production of structures is related to the share of land in the value of
tangible assets in Section 3.4.
6This means the ￿rm follows a particular policy of equity issue and dividend payouts. However, alternative
policies do not change allocations because the Modigliani-Miller Theorem holds in our economy under perfect
foresight and would only complicate subsequent expressions.
6investment costs and the value of equities after investment. The right hand side (RHS) equals
the value of equity at the beginning of the period (before investment has taken place).
The owners of equity pay pt to acquire one unit and immediately receive rt as a rental
payment (including imputed rents). Next period, the owner earns qt+1 before investment





There are no aggregate shocks in this economy except for unanticipated, initial shocks. As
a result, we assume that agents have perfect foresight for all aggregate variables, including
the rate of return.
From (5) and (6) under perfect foresight, the value of the ￿rm (V F
t ) to the equity holders
from the previous period is equal to the present value of the net cash ￿ ow from production
and the rental income of tangible assets produced:
V
F
t ￿ qtZt￿1 = Yt ￿ wtNt ￿ rtZY t ￿ It + rtZt + (pt ￿ rt)Zt (7)






The ￿rm takes fwt;rt;Rtg as given and chooses a production plan fNt;ZY t;Yt;It;Ktg to
maximize the value of the ￿rm, subject to the constraints of technology (1);(2);(3) and (4):
Since the production function of output is constant returns to scale, there is no pro￿t
from output production. Therefore, the value of the ￿rm equals the value of the tangible
asset stock. Given that the number of equities are maintained to equal the stock of tangible
assets by assumption, the price of equities equals the price of tangible assets. Hereafter, we
refer to the shares of the ￿rm as the shares of tangible assets.
Households are heterogeneous in labor productivity, and can have either low, medium, or
high productivity, or be retired. Every period, there is a ￿ ow of new households born with
low productivity without any inheritance of the asset. Each low productivity household
may switch to medium productivity in the next period with a constant probability ￿
l. Each
medium productivity household has a constant probability ￿
m to become a high productivity
one in the next period. Once a household has switched to high productivity it remains
7at this high productivity until retirement. All the households with low, medium and high
productivity are called workers, and all the workers have a constant probability 1￿! 2 (0;1)
of retiring next period. Once retired, each household has a constant probability 1￿￿ 2 (0;1)
of dying before the next period. (In other words, a worker continues to work with probability
!, and a retiree survives with probability ￿ in the next period). The ￿ ow of new born workers
is GN ￿ ! fraction of the workforce in the previous period, where GN > ! > ￿
i for i = l;m.
All the transitions are i.i.d. across a continuum of households and over time, and thus there




t be populations of low, medium and high productivity workers, respectively, and let
Nr
t be the population size of retired households in period t. Then, we have:
N
l






































We choose to formulate the household￿ s life-cycle in this stylized way, following Diaz-Gimenez,
Prescott, Fitzgerald and Alvarez (1992) and Gertler (1999), because we are mainly interested
in the interaction between the life-cycles of households and the aggregate economy. The
three levels of labor productivity give us enough ￿ exibility to mimic a typical life-cycle of
wage income for our aggregate analysis.
Each household derives utility from the consumption of output (ct) and housing services
(ht) of rented or owned housing, and su⁄ers disutility from supplying labor (nt). (We suppress
the index of household i when we describe a typical household). We assume that, when the
household rents a house rather than owning and controlling the same house as an owner-
occupier, she enjoys smaller utility by a factor   2 (0;1). This disadvantage of rented
housing re￿ ects the tenant￿ s limited discretion over the way the house is used and modi￿ed







t [u(ct;[1 ￿  I(rentt)]ht) ￿ v(nt;￿t)]
!
; 0 < ￿ < 1; (8)
8where I(rentt) is an indicator function which takes the value of unity when the household
rents the house in period t and zero when she owns it.7 Disutility of labor v(nt;￿t) is
subject to idiosyncratic shocks to its labor productivity ￿t, which consists of the persistent
component "t and transitory component ￿t as
￿t = "t￿t (9)
The persistent component "t is either high ("h), medium ("m), low ("l), or 0, depending on
whether the household has high, medium or low productivity, or is retired, and follows the
stationary Markov process described above. The transitory component ￿t is i.i.d. across
time and across households and has mean of unity.8 E0(Xt) is the expected value of Xt
conditional on survival at date t and conditional on information at date 0. For most of our










and vt = 0 if nt ￿ ￿t; and vt becomes arbitrarily large if nt > ￿t. The parameter ￿ > 0 is the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and ￿ 2 (0;1) re￿ ects the share of consumption of goods
(rather than housing services) in total expenditure. We normalize the labor productivity of

















We focus on the environment in which there are problems in enforcing contracts and there
are constraints on trades in markets. There is no insurance market against the idiosyncratic
shock to labor productivity of each household. The only asset that households hold and
trade is the equity of tangible assets (and the annuity contract upon this equity). An owner-
occupier can issue equity on its own house to raise funds from the other agents. But the
7We assume that, in order to enjoy full utility of the house, the household must own and control the
entire house used. If the household rents a fraction of the house used, then she will not enjoy full utility
even for the fraction of the house owned.
8The transitory labor productivity shock helps to generate smooth distribution of net worth of households
of the same persistent labor productivity.
9other agents only buy equity up to a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ 2 [0;1) of the house. Thus, to control
the house and enjoy full utility of a house of size ht, the owner-occupier must hold su¢ cient
equity st to satisfy:
st > ￿ht: (11)
We can think of this constraint as a collateral constraint for a residential mortgage ￿ even
though in our economy the mortgage is ￿nanced by equity rather than debt ￿ and we take ￿
as an exogenous parameter of the collateral constraint. Because the tenant household does
not have a collateral asset, we assume the tenant cannot borrow (or issue equities):
st ￿ 0: (12)
We restrict tradeable assets to be the homogeneous equity of tangible assets in order to
abstract from the portfolio choice of heterogeneous households facing collateral constraints
and uninsurable labor income risk. Because we analyze the economy under the assumption
of perfect foresight about the aggregate states, this restriction on tradeable assets is not
substantive (because all the tradeable assets would earn the same rate of return), except for
the case of an unanticipated aggregate shock.9
The ￿ ow-of-funds constraint of the worker is given by:
ct + rtht + ptst = (1 ￿ ￿)wt￿t + rtst + qtst￿1; (13)
where ￿ is a constant tax rate on wage income. The LHS is consumption, the rental cost of
housing (or opportunity cost of using a house rather than renting it out), and purchases of
equities. The RHS is gross receipts, which is the sum of after tax wage income, the rental
9Although we do not attempt to derive these restrictions on market transactions explicitly as the outcome
of an optimal contract, the restrictions are broadly consistent with our environment in which agents can
default on contracts, misrepresent their wage income, and can trade assets anonymously (if they wish). The
outside equity holders (creditors) ask the home owners to maintain some fraction of the housing equity to
prevent default. There is no separate market for equities on land and capital upon it, because people prefer
to control land and capital together in order to avoid the complications. Cole and Kocherlakota (2001)
show that, if agents can misrepresent their idiosyncratic income and can save privately, the optimal contract
is a simple debt contract with a credit limit. See Lustig (2004) and Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005b)
for analysis of optimal contracts with tangible assets as collateral.
10income from equities purchased this period, and the pre-investment value of equity held from
the previous period.10
For the retiree who only survives until the next period with probability ￿, there is a
competitive annuity market in which the owner of a unit annuity will receive the gross
returns qt+1=￿ if and only if the owner survives, and receive nothing if dead. The retiree
















￿ (1 ￿ ￿)"
l:
The ￿ ow-of-funds constraint for the retiree is




Each household takes the equity from the previous period (st￿1) and the joint process of
prices, and idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks fwt;rt;pt;qt;"tg as given, and chooses the
plan of consumption of goods and housing, and the equity holding fct;ht;stg to maximize
the expected discounted utility subject to the constraints of ￿ ow-of-funds and collateral.
The representative foreigner makes purchases of goods C￿
t and equities of tangible assets
S￿
t in the home country (both C￿
t and S￿
t can be negative), subject to the international










10When the worker is an owner-occupier of a house of size ht and issues equity to the outside equity holders
(creditors) by outstanding size of (ht ￿ st) in period t, she faces the ￿ ow-of-funds constraint:
ct + [ptht ￿ qtht￿1] + rt(ht ￿ st) = (1 ￿ ￿)wt￿t + [pt (ht ￿ st) ￿ qt(ht￿1 ￿ st￿1)]:
The LHS is an out￿ ow of funds: consumption, purchases of the owned house over the resale value of the
house held from last period, and rental income paid to the outside equity holders of this period. The RHS
is an in￿ ow: after-tax wage income, and the value of new issues of outside equity above the value of outside
equity from the previous period. By rearranging this, we ￿nd that both the owner-occupier and tenant face
the same ￿ ow-of-funds constraint (13); in which only the net position of equity matters.
11The LHS is gross expenditure of the foreigner on home goods and equities, and the RHS
is the gross receipts. We will focus on two special cases: one is a closed economy in which
S￿ = 0, and another is a small open economy in which Rt = R￿
t where R￿
t is the exogenous
foreign interest rate.
Given the above choices of households, the representative ￿rm and the foreigner, the
competitive equilibrium of our economy is characterized by the prices fwt;rt;ptg which clear



































st (i)di + S
￿
t: (19)
and (3):11 Because of Walras￿Law, only three out of four market clearing conditions are
independent.
2.2 Behavior of Representative Firm
The ￿rst order conditions for the value maximization of the representative ￿rm are:
wt = (1 ￿ ￿)Yt=Nt; (20)























The ￿rst two equations are the familiar equality of price and marginal products of factors of
production. The value of Mt is the labor in e¢ ciency unit, and ft is a fraction of tangible
assets used for production. The last equation says that the opportunity cost of holding
11The name of individual household i is such that a fraction of new-born households named after the names





12capital for one period ￿the cost of capital ￿should be equal to the marginal value product


























Because there is no pro￿t associated with regular production, the value of the ￿rm is:
V
F
t = rtZt ￿ (Kt ￿ ￿Kt￿1) +
1
Rt
[rt+1Zt+1 ￿ (Kt+1 ￿ ￿Kt)] + ::: (25)

















The ￿rst term of the RHS is the capital stock inherited from the previous period, and the
second term is the value of land, which is proportional to the present value of the return to
land which comes from output and housing service production. Thus, the equity holders as
a whole receive returns from capital and land through their holdings of equities of the entire
tangible asset.
2.3 Household Behavior
The household chooses one among three modes of housing - becoming a tenant, a credit con-
strained owner-occupier, and an unconstrained owner-occupier. The ￿ ow-of-funds constraint
of the worker and retiree can be rewritten as
ct + rtht + (pt ￿ rt)st = (1 ￿ ￿)wt￿t + qtst￿1 ￿ xt;
ct + rtht + (pt ￿ rt)st = bt + [qt=￿]st￿1 ￿ xt;
where xt is the liquid wealth of the household. Liquid wealth is the wealth of the household,
excluding illiquid human capital (the expected discounted value of future wages and pension
income). We call liquid wealth ￿net worth￿hereafter.
132.3.1 The tenant








Using the ￿ ow-of-funds constraint we can express housing and consumption as functions of
current expenditure:
ct = ￿[xt ￿ (pt ￿ rt)st];
and
ht =
(1 ￿ ￿)[xt ￿ (pt ￿ rt)st]
rt
:






xt ￿ (pt ￿ rt)st
[rt=(1 ￿  )]1￿￿
￿1￿￿
:
Due to the lower utility from living in a rented house, the tenant e⁄ectively faces a higher
rental price than the owner-occupier for the same utility, i.e., [rt=(1 ￿  )] rather than rt:
2.3.2 The constrained owner-occupier
The constrained owner-occupier faces a binding collateral constraint as:
st = ￿ht:
Thus he consumes ht = st=￿ amount of housing services, and spends the remaining on goods
as:
ct = xt ￿
￿























142.3.3 The unconstrained owner-occupier
The collateral constraint is not binding for the unconstrained owner-occupier. Her intra-
temporal choice is identical to the tenant￿ s but she does not su⁄er from the limited discretion











Let At be the vector of variables and a function that characterizes the aggregate state of the
economy at the beginning of period t :












where ￿t("t(i);st￿1(i)) is the date t joint distribution function of present persistent produc-
tivity and equity holdings from the previous period across households. Each household
has perfect foresight about the future evolution of this aggregate state, even if each faces
idiosyncratic risks on her labor productivity. The prices (wt;rt;pt;qt) would be a function
of this aggregate state in equilibrium. We can express the value functions of the retiree,
high, medium and the low productivity worker by V r(xt;At); V h(xt;At); V m(xt;At); and
V l(xt;At) as functions of the individual net worth and the aggregate state.
The retiree chooses the mode of housing and an annuity contract on equities, st, subject















where uj (st;xt;rt;pt) is the indirect utility function of present consumption and housing
services when the mode of housing is tenant (j = T), constrained owner-occupier (j = C),
or unconstrained owner-occupier (j = U).
The worker chooses the mode of housing and saving in equities. The value function of a










uj (st;xt;rt;pt) + ￿f!E￿[V h((1 ￿ ￿)"h￿wt+1 + qt+1st;At+1)]






The high productivity worker continues to work with probability ! and retires with proba-
bility 1 ￿ ! in the next period.
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Next period, the medium productivity worker switches to high productivity with probability
￿
m, retires with probability 1 ￿ !, and remains with medium productivity with probability
!￿￿
m: The value function of a low productivity worker is similar to the value function of a
medium productivity worker, except for m being replaced by l and h being replaced by m.
Growth in the economy with land presents a unique problem for the solution of the
individual agent problem because wages grow at di⁄erent rates from the rental price and
the equity price even in the steady state. This means that we need to transform the non-
stationary per capita variables in the model into stationary per capita units. In Appendix
B, we describe how to convert the value functions of the household into a stationary repre-
sentation.
2.4 Steady State Growth
Before calibrating, it is useful to examine the steady state growth properties of our economy.
Let GX = Xt+1=Xt be the steady state growth factor of variable Xt. In the following we
simply call the growth factor as the ￿growth rate￿ . In steady state, the growth rate of










16The growth rate of tangible assets need not be equal the growth rate of output, but it should







Then, from the production functions, these growth rates depend upon the growth rates of
aggregate labor productivity and population as GY = (GAGN)1￿￿ G
￿







Because the supply of land is ￿xed, to the extent that land is an important input for produc-
ing tangible assets, the growth rates of output and tangible assets are both smaller than the
growth rate of labor in e¢ ciency units. Moreover, because tangible assets are more directly
a⁄ected by the limitation of land than output, the growth rate of tangible assets is lower
than the growth rate of output, when labor in e¢ ciency units is growing.
In the steady state of the competitive economy, the growth rate of the real rental price
and the purchase price of tangible assets is equal to the ratio of the growth rate of output













The rate of increase of the rental price and the purchase price of tangible assets is an
increasing function of the growth rate of workers in e¢ ciency units in steady state. The













Because the per capita supply of land decreases with population growth, the growth rate of
the wage rate is a decreasing function of the population growth rate.
Notice that the growth rates of aggregate quantities and prices only depend upon the
parameters of the production function and the population and labor productivity growth
rates. Because of overlapping generations and Cobb Douglas production functions, there
is always a unique steady state growth in our closed or small open economy with constant
population and labor productivity growth rates, even though the consumption and net worth
of the individual household have di⁄erent trends from the aggregate output per capita.
173 Observations and Steady State Implications
3.1 Observations
3.1.1 Types of Tangible Assets
Here, we gather some observations, which give us some guidance for our calibrations. Our
model has clear implications about the amount of tangible assets and its split between a
productive and a residential component. We use the U.S. ￿ ow of fund accounts (see appendix
A) to compute the average quarterly tangible assets of the non-farm private sector to GDP
(this includes the value of land) and this equals 3.3 for the 1952-2005 period, and is fairly
stable. The fraction of productive tangible assets to total tangible assets (ZY t=Zt) turns out
to be around 0.41 (but this masks a downward trend from around 0.39 in 1991 to around
0.31 in 2005). The value of the total housing stock to GDP has an average value of around
1.94 but again this masks a marked increase from around 2.2 in 1991 to 2.6 in 2005.
3.1.2 Evolution of U.S. home-ownership rates and housing prices
There exists considerable variation in home ownership rates across countries and over time.
Focussing on the recent U.S. experience, Figure 1 plots the home ownership rates (fraction
of households who are owner-occupiers) across di⁄erent age groups from 1991 to 2009. The
￿gure shows a general upward trend that starts after 1995 and basically re￿ ects the choices
of younger cohorts (see Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009) for further discussion).
Variations over time across di⁄erent cohorts may re￿ ect di⁄erences in ￿nancing constraints,
and utility losses from renting, factors that we analyze in the theoretical model. At the same
time as homeownership goes up, real house prices also increase by a substantial amount.
Figure 2 plots the real (de￿ ated by the urban CPI) house price both for the value-weighted
Case-Shiller index and for the equally weighted OFHEO index (for purchase-only transac-
tions). The model we develop will have implications for these observations.
3.2 Calibration
We consider one period to be one year and the baseline economy as the United States.
183.2.1 Labor Income Process
Our analysis will critically hinge on capturing the skewed income distribution in the data.
To deal with this problem we follow Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-Rull (2003) and
construct a simpli￿ed version of their labor income process to capture the substantial earnings
inequality in U.S. data, with the aim of generating endogenously a wealth distribution close
to its empirical counterpart. We pick the probabilities of switching earnings states (￿
l; ￿
m)
and the individual labor income productivity levels ("l;"m;"h) to match six moments. The
￿rst moment is a hump-shape in labor income; we set the ratio of mean income of 41-60 year
old to the mean income of 21-40 year old to be 1:3, based on PSID evidence. The other ￿ve
moments are the ￿ve quintiles of the earnings distribution. All six moments are taken from
Castaneda et. al. (p.839 and table 7, p. 845) but we have independently con￿rmed that even
though these moments change in subsequent waves of the SCF (1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004),
these changes are very small. Given that we normalize the average productivity to one, this
means we have 4 parameters to match 6 moments. This results in setting f￿
l = 0:0338;
￿
m = 0:0247g, while the ratio of the middle to low productivity is 4:51 and the ratio of
high to low productivity is 15:75. Following the bu⁄er stock saving literature (for example,
Deaton (1991) or Carroll (1997)) we assume that the transitory shock (￿t) is log-normally
distributed with mean ￿0:5 ￿ ￿2
￿ and standard deviation ￿￿ = 0:1.
The probability of continuing to work (!) is set so that the expected duration of working
life is 45:5 years, while the probability of the retiree to survive (￿) implies an expected
retirement duration of 18:2 years. The replacement ratio (b) is chosen so that the replacement
rate for the workers with low or medium productivity is 40%, consistent with the data from
the PSID (very high earnings workers similar to our "h types will be top-coded in the PSID).
We set the growth rate of labor productivity (GA) to two percent, and the population growth
rate (GN) to one percent.
3.2.2 Other parameters
Using the Cooley and Prescott (1995) methodology of aligning the data to their theoretical
counterparts, Appendix C outlines how we calculate the share of productive tangible assets
19in the production of non-housing ￿nal output (￿) from the NIPA data for the period 1952:Q1
to 2005:Q4. This share equals 0:258 which is a bit lower than the one used in other studies
(between 0:3 and 0:4), because we treat the production of housing services separately (and
this is a capital intensive sector).
A key parameter in our model is the share of land in the production of tangible assets
(1 ￿ ￿). Thinking of the U.S. economy as our baseline, we set ￿ = 0:9 since Haughwout
and Inman (2001) calculate the share of land in property income between 1987 and 2005 to
be about 10:9%, while Davis and Heathcote (2005) also use ￿ = 0:9. Davis and Heathcote
(2007) note that the share of land in residential housing values has risen recently in the U.S.,
and it is close to 50% in major metropolitan areas like Boston and San Francisco. We will
run some experiments for the U.K., a country where we think land restrictions are more
important than in the U.S.. Absent a model with regional variation in ￿ (an interesting
topic for further research), we will use a lower ￿ to match aggregate features in the U.K.
with the aim of better understanding the in￿ uence of the share of land on the allocations in
the steady state as well as in the transition.
The depreciation rate of the capital stock (1￿￿) is set at 10 percent per annum and the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion at 2. For the baseline, we consider a closed economy as the
baseline. Recent papers have calibrated ￿ (the share of non-durables in total expenditure) at
around 0:8 (Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2010) use 0:83 and Li and Yao (2007) use 0:8 based on
the average share of housing expenditure found in the 2001 Consumer Expenditure Survey).
We use a slightly lower number (0:76) since we think of housing as inclusive of other durables,
while Morris and Ortalo-Magne (2008) provide evidence supporting this choice.
The fraction of a house that needs a downpayment (￿) is set at 20%, consistent with the
evidence in Chambers et. al. (2009) who estimate this to be 21% for ￿rst-time buyers in
the early 1990s. We perform extensive comparative statics relative to this parameter since
one of our goals is to better understand the role of collateral constraints on home-ownership
rates, house prices and allocations.
203.2.3 Model Targets
We choose the discount factor (￿) to generate a reasonable tangible assets to output ratio
(3:3), and the fraction of utility loss from renting a house ( ) to generate the number of
renters observed in the data (36% in 1992). This yields ￿ = 0:9469 and   = 0:0608 for the
baseline economy.
3.3 General Features of Household Behavior
The household chooses present consumption, saving, and mode of housing, taking into ac-
count its net worth and its expectations of future income. Figure 3A illustrates the con-
sumption of goods, housing services and the mode of housing of the worker with low pro-
ductivity as a function of net worth. In order to explore the stable relationship between the
household choice and the state variable, we detrend all variables using their own theoretical
trend as in Appendix B. When the worker does not have much net worth, x < x1l, he
does not have enough to pay for a downpayment of even a tiny house. He chooses to rent
a modest house and consume a modest amount. In Figure 3B; the locus s0 = s(s;q;yl)
shows the equity-holding at the end of the present period as a function of the equity-holding
at the end of the last period for the low productivity worker when the transitory income
is the average (￿ = 1). Everyone enters the labor market with low productivity and no
inheritance (s0 = 0). Because the s0 = s(s;q;yl) locus lies below the 45-degree line for small
enough s, as long as the worker continues to be with low productivity, he does not save -
aside from small saving stemming from the transitory wage income shock - hoping to become
more productive in the future. He continues to live in a rented house.12
Figure 4A shows the choice of a worker in the medium productivity state. When she
does not have much net worth to pay for a downpayment to buy a house, x < x1m; she chooses
to rent a place, a similar behavior with the low productivity worker. The main di⁄erence is
that the medium productivity worker saves to accumulate the downpayment to buy a house
12No saving by a low productivity worker is not always true. If the income gap between low productivity
and higher productivity workers is small, the transition probability from less to more productive states is
small, or the pension is very limited, then the low productivity worker saves to buy a house for retirement.
21in the future. In Figure 4B; the s0 = s(s;q;ym) locus of the medium productivity worker
lies above the 45-degree line for s < sm￿, so that the equity holding at the end of this period
is larger than the last period. When the medium productivity worker accumulates modest
net worth, x 2 [x1m;x2m] in Figure 4A; she buys her own house subject to the binding
collateral constraint. Here, the size of an owned house is a sharply increasing function of
net worth, because the worker maximizes the size of the house subject to the downpayment
constraint.13 When the medium productivity worker has substantial net worth x > x2m; she
becomes an unconstrained home owner, using her saving partly to repay the debt (or increase
the housing equity ownership). In Figure 4B, the medium productivity worker continues
to accumulate her equity holding until she reaches the neighborhood of equity-holding at
sm￿; the intersection of s(s;q;ym) and the 45-degree line.
The behavior of the high productivity worker is similar to the medium productivity
one, except that she accumulates more equities: s0 = s(s;q;yh) lies above s0 = s(s;q;ym)
and her converging equity-holding sh￿ is larger than that of medium productive worker sm￿:
Therefore, the equity holding of all the workers is distributed between 0 and the neighborhood
of sh￿; with a mass of workers in the neighborhood of s = 0; s = sm￿ and s = sh￿: The
retiree decumulates assets very slowly as the rate of return is lower than the growth-adjusted
rate of time preference.
Putting together these arguments, we can draw a picture of a typical life-cycle in Figure
5: The horizontal axis counts years from the beginning of work-life, and the vertical axis
measures housing consumption (h) and equity-holding (s). Starting from no inheritance, he
chooses to live in a rented house without saving during the young and low wage periods until
the 6th year. When he becomes a medium productivity wage worker at the 7th year, he
starts saving vigorously. Quickly, he buys a house subject to the collateral constraint. Then
13The size of the house at net worth x = x1m is smaller than the house rented at net worth slightly below
x1m, because she can only a⁄ord to pay downpayment on a smaller house. (Nonetheless, she is happier
than before due to larger utility from an owner-occupied house). The worker moves to a bigger house every
period in our model because there are no transaction costs. If there were transaction costs, the worker
would move infrequently, and change housing consumption by discrete amounts, rather than continuously.
She may even buy ￿rst a larger house than the house rented before, anticipating the future transaction cost.
But the basic features remain the same.
22he moves up fast the housing ladder to become a unconstrained home owner. Afterwards, he
starts increasing the fraction of his own equity of the house (similar to repaying the debt).
By the time of retirement, he has repaid all the mortgage and has accumulated equities
higher than the value of his own house. When the worker hits the wall of retirement (with
the arrival of a retirement shock) at the 50th year, his permanent income drops, and he
moves to a smaller house. He also sells all the equities to buy an annuity contract on the
equities, because the annuity earns the gross rate of return which is (1=￿) > 1 times as
much as straightforward equity-holding. But his e⁄ective utility discount factor shrinks by
a factor ￿ too. Thus as the rate of return on the annuity is not su¢ ciently high to induce
the retiree to save enough, he decumulates slowly the relative equity-holding, downsizing
his consumption of goods and housing services relative to the working population as he gets
older. When he dies, his assets drop to zero according to the annuity contract.
3.4 Comparison of Steady States
We compare the implications of the model for the steady state economy with the data in
the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF, 1992). Table 1 reports the ￿ve quintiles of
earnings and net worth implied by the model and their empirical counterparts. The earnings
quintiles are matched exactly since the parameters of the earnings process were chosen to
achieve this objective before the model is solved. Given the skewed earnings distribution,
the model generates a very skewed net worth distribution as well, slightly more skewed to
the right than the data. The model distribution of net worth for homeowners is even more
unequal than in the data, re￿ ecting that only very poor households remain tenants. The
self-reported house value for homeowners is more evenly distributed than net worth both in
the data and in the model.
Table 2 (panel A) compares mean net worth as a ratio to per capita GDP between the
data and the model for di⁄erent groups. The total net worth normalized by per capita
GDP adds up to the calibration target of the model (3.29). Conditional on home owning,
owners are wealthier than tenants, both in the model and in the data. Although the model
approximately matches the average net worth of owners (4.76 in the data versus 5.52 in the
23model), it completely misses the net worth of tenants - tenants own very little net worth in
the model while in the data they do own something. The reason is that the model abstracts
from determinants of renting other than poverty. But given the richness of other moments
that we match we are going to leave a more explicit calibration that captures the wealth
accumulation for the tenants to future work. The average (self-reported) house value is 1.93
times as large as per capita GDP in the SCF data versus 2.34 in the model. The mean
leverage ratio - the mean ratio of house value to net worth conditional on being an owner-
occupier (h=s in the model) - is 1.39 in the data versus 1.49 in the model. Panel B illustrates
that the model captures well the rising homeownership over the lifecycle. Panel C reports
net worth and home value relative to per capita GDP for the di⁄erent groups over the life
cycle. Household net worth and house values increase over the life cycle in the data, which
is consistent with the model.
We interpret these results as suggesting that the model generates reasonable implications
relative to the information in the 1992 SCF. Given this interpretation, we now would like to
understand how the endogenous variables in the model (house prices and home-ownership
rates) depend upon exogenous fundamentals in steady state. We restrict our attention to
three main changes in the fundamentals: greater ￿nancial development, a higher productivity
growth and a fall in the world real interest rate, since we view these as reasonable exogenous
changes to fundamentals given the US experience in the 1990s.
Table 3 reports steady state comparisons for the baseline (U.S.) calibration (panel A).
In the ￿rst column, the fraction of tenants in the population is 36%, which is equal to the
US tenancy rate in the early 1990s (by our choice of the utility-loss from renting). The
fraction of constrained home owners is 13:9%. The fraction of houses lived in by tenants
and constrained home owners is smaller than the fraction of their population because they
tend to live in smaller houses than the unconstrained home owners. The average house
size is about 19:5% (= 7:02=35:92) of the economy average for tenants, and is about 21%
for constrained home owners. The tenants and the constrained home owners live in smaller
houses than the average mainly because they have lower permanent income. The distribution
of equity-holding is even more unequal across the groups of households in di⁄erent modes
of housing. The fraction of total equities held by tenants is negligible (0:1%), the fraction
24of total equities held by constrained home owners is 2:97%, and the remainder is held by
unconstrained home owners.
Turning to prices and aggregate variables, the gross rate of return on equity-holding is
1:0669 in terms of goods, and is equal to 1:0669￿G1￿￿
r = 1:0662 in terms of the consumption
basket. The latter is smaller than the inverse of the discount factor, which, adjusted for
growth e⁄ects, equals (1=￿)(Gw=G1￿￿
r )
￿ = 1:095: This is not because people are impatient,
but because people tend to save substantially during the working period to cope with idio-
syncratic shocks to wage income and to mitigate the collateral constraint. Many general
equilibrium models with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk have such a feature, including Bewley
(1983) and Aiyagari (1994). The ratio of average housing value to the average wage is 2:4
years, while the housing price to rental ratio is 8:6 years in the baseline economy. The share
of housing in total tangible assets is 45% (compared to 41% in the post war US economy,
see appendix C).14
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 report the results for a di⁄erent level of ￿nancial develop-
ment, keeping the interest rate constant at its closed economy counterpart in column 1, by
considering a corresponding small open economy. Column 2 is the case of a more advanced
￿nancial system, where the fraction of house that needs downpayment is 0:1 instead of 0:2
of the baseline. The main di⁄erence relative to the baseline economy is that now there are
more constrained home owners instead of tenants. Intuitively, because borrowing becomes
easier, relatively poor households buy a house with high leverage (outside equity ownership)
instead of renting. Column 3, by comparison, is the case of no housing mortgage (￿ = 1)
so that the household must buy the house from its own net worth. In this economy, more
than a half of households are tenants. Financial development a⁄ects substantially the home-
ownership rate. On the other hand, ￿nancial development by itself has limited e⁄ects on
14From (27) we learn that the steady state annual growth rate in rents of the baseline economy will be
0:3% when ￿ = 0:9: Davis et. al. (2008) compute the annual rent for the U.S. economy since 1960 and the
mean real growth rate is found to be 1:17% with a standard deviation of 1:5%. Another prediction of the
model involves the long run growth in house prices which is predicted to be equal to the growth rate in rents
(therefore 0:3%). Using the OFHEO average annual house price data from 1960 to 2007 we calculate a real
(de￿ ating using the US CPI) annual growth rate of 2:1% with a standard deviation of 3:3%.
25prices and aggregate quantities in steady state. This result arises because the share of net
worth of tenants and constrained households (who are directly in￿ uenced by the ￿nancing
constraint) is a small fraction of aggregate net worth, and because the required adjustment
is mostly achieved through the conversion of houses from rental to owner-occupied units.
In column 4, we consider a small open economy in which the growth rate of labor produc-
tivity is three percent instead of two percent. A higher growth rate of productivity, keeping
the world interest rate constant, raises the housing price-rental ratio from 8:6 to 9:6, because
the real rental price is expected to rise faster as in (27). The value of housing to the average
wage rises from 2:4 to 2:5, as does the value of tangible assets to GDP. In the new steady
state, the percentage of tenants is much higher (50% from 36%) as housing prices-rental
ratio is substantially higher.
In Column 5, we consider an open economy where the world interest rate is lower by one
percentage point. A lower world interest rate increases the house price-rental ratio from 8:6
to 9:9; which leads to a higher tenancy rate, 50% instead of 36% of the baseline.
3.4.1 ￿UK calibration￿
One of the key messages of our work is that the constraint imposed by land as a ￿xed factor
of production can have important implications for the behavior of house prices and home-
ownership. In order to illustrate the general equilibrium e⁄ect of the di⁄erent importance
of land for production of tangible assets (1 ￿ ￿), we change 3 parameters from the previous
calibration and argue that this can give useful insights to a country like the U.K. Speci￿cally,
f￿;￿; g are chosen so that the interest rate remains at 6:69% in the closed economy, the
ratio of tangible assets to GDP is equal to 4:29 (the UK average between 1987 and 2008, for
which the data exist) and the homeownership rate is equal to 68% (the UK number in the
early 1990s). The resulting parameter values are ￿ = 0:783 (a larger share of land in the
production of tangible assets than in the US), ￿ = 0:9612 and   = 0:0598.
The baseline results (column 1) in Panel B of Table 3 illustrate that the value of housing
relative to wages rises from 2:39 in the ￿ = 0:9 economy (US calibration) to 3:23 in the
￿ = 0:78 one (UK calibration), and that the housing price to rental ratio rises from 8:58 to
2610:96. Why is the value of tangible assets to GDP and the price to rental ratio much higher
in the UK calibration? Since land neither depreciates nor accumulates, as land becomes
more important for tangible assets relative to the capital stock, the e⁄ective depreciation of
tangible capital falls and the expected growth rate of the rental price rises. Thus, the ratio
of tangible asset value to GDP and the housing price to rental ratio are larger in the UK
calibration.15
There are two ways to measure the importance of land for tangible assets. One is the
share of land in the production of tangible assets (1 ￿ ￿). The other is the share of land
in the value of tangible assets. In the steady state, we can compute the present value of









Note that physical capital depreciates through ￿, while the imputed rental income of land
grows at the rate of aggregate output growth in the steady state because the ratio of land
value to aggregate GDP is stable in the steady state. Thus, in the US baseline economy in
which 1 ￿ ￿ = 10%; R = 1:0669 and GY = 1:029; the share of land in the value of tangible
assets is equal to 33%. (Davis and Heathcote (2007) produce estimates of the share of land
in U.S. residential tangible assets and the annual average between 1930 and 2000 is 24:7%
with a standard deviation of 9:6%.16) For the UK baseline economy in which ￿ = 0:78, the
share of land in the value of tangible assets is 55% for the same real rate of return.
15From columns 2 and 3 of Table 3, we observe that changing the collateral constraint again only a⁄ects
the homeownership rate and does not a⁄ect equilibrium prices. A higher productivity growth changes in
column 4 substantially the house price to rental ratio (from 11:0 to 12:9). A reduction in the world interest
rate in column 5 also substantially a⁄ects equilibrium prices. The main di⁄erence from the US calibration
comes from the higher share of land which makes the price to rental ratio rise more in the UK calibration.
In this economy the price to rent ratio rises from 11:0 to 13:2 (a 21% increase), while in the US calibration
(￿ = 0:9) this ratio rises from 8:6 to 9:9 (a 15% increase).
16Thus, our assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function for structures is generally consistent with
the U.S. data. Moreover, for Japan Kiyotaki and West (2006) provide evidence that the elasticity of substi-
tution between land and capital is not signi￿cantly larger than unity for the period 1961-1995.
274 Winners and Losers in Housing Markets
We now examine how the small open economy reacts to a once-for-all change in di⁄erent
fundamental conditions of technology and the ￿nancial environment. We change a para-
meter once-and-for-all unexpectedly and solve for the path of prices and quantities that
lead the economy to the new steady state. Here, we assume perfect foresight except for
the initial surprise. Details of the numerical procedure can be found in Appendix A, but
the basic procedure is as follows. First guess a set of rental rates over the next (say) 50
years, which converges to the new steady state; then solve backwards the household prob-
lem based on these prices; and ￿nally update this price vector until the market for use of
tangible assets clears in all periods. To highlight the importance of land, we compare the
reaction of the economy with a larger share of land in the production of tangible assets
(￿ = 0:78; the ￿UK calibration￿ ) with the baseline economy (￿ = 0:9, the US calibration).
4.1 Welfare Evaluations
We are particularly interested in how an unanticipated change in fundamentals a⁄ects the
wealth and welfare of various groups of households di⁄erently. Here, using the joint distrib-
ution of current productivity and equity holdings from the previous period ￿("t(i);s￿1 (i))
in the steady state before the shock hits, we de￿ne the group as the set Ig of individual
households of a particular labor productivity (low, medium, high, and retired (l;m;h;r)),
and a particular range of equity holdings of the previous period which corresponds to a
particular home-ownership mode (tenant, constrained owner or unconstrained owner) in the
old steady state. For example, the low-wage worker tenant group is a group of agents with
low labor productivity who choose to be tenants under the old steady state.
One simple measure of the distribution e⁄ect is the average rate of change of net worth.
Let j (i) be present labor productivity of (j(i) = h;m;l and r) of individual i. Then the
net worth of individual i depends upon the wage rate and equity price as:
x(i) = w￿
j(i)￿ + qe s￿1(i);
where ￿j = (1￿￿)"j for worker of productivity j and ￿j = (b=w) for j = r; retired, e s￿1 (i) =
28s￿1 (i) if i was a worker and e s￿1 (i) = s￿1 (i)=￿ if i was a retiree in the previous period.
Then, the average rate of change in net worth (non-human wealth) of group Ig is:
average of
￿
[wn￿j(i)￿ + qne s￿1(i)]
[wo￿j(i)￿ + qoe s￿1(i)]
￿ 1
￿
for all i 2 Ig (30)
where (wo;qo) are the wage rate and equity price in the old steady state, and (wn;qn) are
those immediately after the shock.
To calculate welfare changes we use the value functions. Given that we have solved for
the prices and value functions for all the periods in the transition, we know that the value
functions at the period when the change in fundamentals takes place is a su¢ cient statistic
for the welfare e⁄ect of the shock. Let V
j(i)
o (x(i)) be the value function at the old steady
state and V
j(i)
n (x(i)) be the value function in the period of the shock￿ s arrival as a function
of net worth x(i) and labor productivity.17 We compute a measure of welfare change for
the group Ig as:






n ([wn￿j(i)￿ + qne s￿1(i)])
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j(i)





5 for all i 2 Ig: (31)
We call this measure as the certainty expenditure equivalent, because we convert the change
of the value into the dimension of expenditure before taking the average.18
17Note that Vn is the value function that has been derived after the full perfect foresight transition has
been solved for and therefore includes all this information about the transition to the new steady state.
18 We also computed the net worth equivalent that would make a household indi⁄erent between the period
before and after the shock as the value of ￿(i) such that
V j(i)
o ([wo￿j(i)￿ + qoe s￿1(i)]) = V j(i)
n (￿(i)[wn￿j(i)￿ + qne s￿1(i)])
The value of ￿(i) measures how much the initial net worth must be multiplied immediately after the shock
in order to maintain the same level of the expected discounted utility as the old steady state. We can ￿nd
the net worth equivalent uniquely, because the value functions are monotonically increasing. We can then
compute the average of individual ￿(i) ￿ 1 for a particular group g of agents as e ￿g. This welfare measure
su⁄ers from the drawback that net worth does not include the value of human capital. Thus, if two groups
have di⁄erent ratios of net worth (liquid wealth) to human capital, a di⁄erence in e ￿g may re￿ ect the di⁄erence
of the ratio of human to non-human wealth rather than the di⁄erence in the welfare e⁄ect.
294.2 Transition of Small Open Economy following a Change in Fun-
damentals
Figure 6 shows the responses to a once-for-all increase in the growth rate of labor produc-
tivity from 2% to 3%. Because the economy is growing, all the following ￿gures show the
percentage di⁄erence from the old steady state growth path of the baseline economy. In
both economies the housing price increases substantially initially and continues to increase
afterwards. In the economy with a larger share of land (￿ = 0:78), the increase in house
prices is larger, and real house price in￿ ation afterwards is higher. The housing price-rental
ratio is going to be higher, anticipating the increase in the rental price in the future. The
home-ownership rate gradually declines because young workers take a longer time to ac-
cumulate a su¢ cient downpayment to buy a house. Consumption of goods and housing
services increase initially as well as afterwards, re￿ ecting higher permanent income. The
share of productive tangible assets (ZY t=Zt) falls initially, to accommodate a larger demand
for residential tangible assets by converting productive to residential tangible assets.
Table 4 reports the average rate of change of welfare (31) in Panel A and the average
rate of change of current net worth (30) in Panel B for each group against changes in the
fundamentals, for the baseline economy (￿ = 0:9) and the economy with a larger share of
land (￿ = 0:78). The ￿rst and second columns report the average rate of changes from
an increase in the growth rate of labor productivity from 2% to 3%. Given the higher
productivity growth, households are on average better o⁄ with a higher permanent income.
(Remember the retiree￿ s bene￿t is proportional to the wage rate of present workers). The
higher housing price, however, a⁄ects the welfare of di⁄erent groups of households di⁄erently.
Those who buy (or expand) houses in the future gain less from the housing price hike, while
those who sell houses in the future gain more. Speci￿cally, unconstrained homeowners as
a group gain more than tenants and constrained homeowners. The gap in welfare e⁄ects
between unconstrained homeowners and the other groups is particularly large for the retirees.
Overall, one main message from this analysis is that the redistribution e⁄ect is larger in the
economy with the larger share of land since the house price hike is bigger in this economy.
We can observe the change in current net worth in Panel B. The net worth of uncon-
30strained homeowners increases by a much larger amount than tenants￿net worth because
the former own much more non-human wealth. Thus, those with larger holdings of shares
experience a bigger increase in net worth with the house price rise, and the increase is more
pronounced where land is more important.
Figure 7 shows how these two economies react to a once-for-all fall in the world real
interest rate by 1%. In both economies, housing prices and output increase with large
in￿ ows of capital, and the adjustment of housing prices is fast. In the economy with a larger
share of land, the swing of net exports and consumption is larger, output takes a longer time
to increase despite the large increase in the capital stock, because a large amount of tangible
assets gets allocated to housing in the early stages of the transition. The home-ownership
rate declines gradually because the lower real interest rate discourages saving, delaying the
age of switching from renting to owning a house over the life cycle.
The third and fourth columns of Table 4 report the reaction of welfare to this decrease
in the world real interest rate for the two economies with di⁄erent shares of land. Looking
at the value of net worth in Panel B, all groups have a larger net worth from a higher house
price, and the net worth increase is larger group-by-group in the economy with a larger
share of land (￿ = 0:78). As we discussed in the Introduction (especially in footnote 3),
however, the increase in housing price per se does not have an aggregate wealth e⁄ect on
consumption nor welfare, but mainly redistributes wealth between net sellers and net buyers
of houses. Unconstrained homeowner retirees gain most from the house price hike due to
a lower interest rate. Although workers gain from a higher wage rate due to the capital
in￿ ow, workers as a whole are savers who su⁄er from a lower interest rate, particularly high
income workers. Thus despite the capital gains on housing, the high income workers and
unconstrained homeowner workers lose from a lower interest rate in our calibration, and the
loss is larger when the share of land is small (￿ = 0:9), that is, when the capital gains on
the house is small.
These two experiments illustrate the idea that the relationship between housing price
changes and welfare depends upon the underlying cause of the house price change. House
prices are higher by a similar magnitude after either a higher productivity shock or a lower
world interest rate, but in our calibrations workers as a whole gain from the productivity
31improvement but lose as a whole from the interest rate decrease.19
We have also done the experiment of lowering the downpayment requirement from 20%
to 10% permanently. This provides extra liquidity for households, especially for constrained
home owners, and encourages consumption initially. At the same time, with a less strin-
gent collateral constraint, some low wage workers and tenants from the previous period buy
houses. Overall, however, relaxing the ￿nancing constraint has a very limited e⁄ect on hous-
ing price and aggregate production in the transition, a result similar to the comparisons of the
steady states, because the necessary adjustment is mostly achieved by the modest conversion
of rented to owned units rather than by the housing price. This contrasts Ortalo-Magne and
Rady (2006), who show that relaxing the collateral constraint increases the housing price
substantially by increasing the housing demand of credit constrained households. In their
model, the net worth of the home-owners with outstanding mortgage is sensitive to the hous-
ing price due to the leverage e⁄ect, which magni￿es the e⁄ect of any shock to fundamentals,
while there is no leverage e⁄ect in our equity ￿nancing economy. Also the supply of houses
and ￿ ats is inelastic in their model. Thus, relaxing the collateral constraint will generate a
large in￿ ow of new owners of ￿ ats and houses, which is not o⁄set by an increase in the supply,
through conversion from rented to owned units, conversion from productive to residential
tangible assets and capital accumulation. A comprehensive analysis of the leverage e⁄ect
and the portfolio decision in the presence of uninsurable earnings and aggregate risk is a
topic for future research.
4.3 A Scenario for House Price Changes?
Putting together the simulation results from these experiments, we can conclude that, if
we were to explain the large increase in housing prices in many developed countries in the
last decades, we could look for increases in the expected growth rate of labor productivity
19Attanasio et. al. (2009) make a similar point empirically. They ￿nd that tenants￿consumption is posi-
tively correlated with house price increases, contradicting the conventional wealth channel. They attribute
this ￿nding to common factors driving both consumption demand and house prices, namely better longer-
run income prospects. Thus, the shock causing higher house prices can be key in determining the e⁄ect on
consumption (and, therefore, welfare).
32and for decreases in the real interest rate. Moreover, to generate a positive correlation
between homeownership rates and house price rises since the early 1990s, we will also need
to simultaneously improve access to credit. An empirically plausible calibration will be
to simultaneously increase the expected growth rate of labor productivity from 2% to 3%;
decrease the world interest rate by one percent and reduce the collateral constraint from
20% to 10%.
The implications for house prices and homeownership rates are given in ￿gures 8 and 9
respectively for the US experience, and ￿gures 10 and 11 for the UK. For the US calibration
￿gure 8 indicates that according to the model, housing prices overshot their equilibrium
values in the 2003-2007 period. Since then prices have actually fallen below the model
generated measure of ￿ fair value￿ . Moreover, the model captures well the increase in home-
ownership rates, even though this increase is much faster in the model than in the data
given the perfect foresight/information assumptions of the model. Interestingly the model
does predict a fall in the homeownership rate after the initial increase as house prices begin
to rise. The wealth changes and the welfare e⁄ects from this simultaneous shock for the
US economy are given in column 5 of table 4. Households are both richer and better o⁄ in
response to this combination of shocks, with the unconstrained home owner retirees gaining
the most in both wealth and welfare.
The responses of the calibration for the ￿UK￿economy are given in ￿gures 10 and 11.
The model captures a lower fraction of the recent runup in housing prices in the UK, but it
also predicts a slight increase in homeownership rates with a decrease predicted in the future
as housing prices reach a higher level. The last column of table 4 illustrates that both wealth
and welfare increase by more in this economy rather than in the ￿ = 0:9 one and that the
e⁄ect is biggest for the unconstrained retirees.
5 Conclusions
This paper develops an aggregate life-cycle model to investigate the interaction between
housing prices, aggregate production, and household behavior over a lifetime. We take
into account land as a ￿xed factor for producing residential and commercial tangible assets
33in order to analyze the implications for the aggregate time series and the cross section of
household choices. Comparing two small open economies with di⁄erent shares of land in the
production of tangible assets, the economy with a larger share of land has a higher housing
price-rental ratio and a lower homeownership rate in the steady state. The transitions of the
small open economy along the perfect foresight path illustrate that, where the share of land
is larger, once-for-all shocks to the growth rate of labor productivity or the world interest
rate generate a greater movement in housing prices.
We also ￿nd that the permanent increase in the growth rate of labor productivity and
the decrease in the world real interest rate substantially redistribute wealth from the net
buyers of houses (relatively poor tenants) to the net sellers (relatively rich unconstrained
homeowners) with the house price hike. On average, households gain from the increase in
the growth rate of labor productivity and do not gain from the decrease in the world interest
rate. Because the gap in welfare e⁄ects between winners and losers in the housing market
is substantial, especially where land is more important for production of tangible assets
compared to capital, we think that a credible welfare evaluation should take into account
household heterogeneity and contract enforcement limitations in housing and credit markets
that generate realistic life-cycles of consumption and homeownership.
Appendix A: Solving the model
Solving the household￿ s decision problem
We discretize net worth (xi
t) using 400 grid points, with denser grids closer to zero to
take into account the higher curvature of the value function in this region. The grid range
for the continuous state variable is veri￿ed ex-post by comparing it with the values obtained
in the simulations. For points which do not lie on the state space grid, we evaluate the value
function using cubic spline interpolation along net worth. We simulate the idiosyncratic
exogenous productivity shock from its three-point distribution. The realizations of these
exogenous random variables are held constant when searching for the market clearing prices
(p and r). We use the policy functions to simulate the behavior of 10000 agents over 600 (the
exact number depends on the probability of exiting working life and the survival probability)
periods and aggregate the individual housing and equity demands to determine the market
34clearing rental and housing price and the equilibrium household allocations.
Solving the perfect foresight model
We guess a sequence of tangible asset rental rates frtg
T
t=1 such that the rental rate has
converged to the new steady state. For an exogenous real interest rate R in the small
open economy, use (22) to calculate a sequence of capital stocks fKtg
T
t=1 and then use
(2) to compute the sequence of fZtg: Then we get tangible asset prices fqt;ptg
T
t=1 from
(25) and V F
t = qtZt￿1 = ptZt ￿ It (which follows from the ￿rm ￿ ow-of-funds and the zero
pro￿t condition). Given these guessed prices, we solve the household￿ s problem backwards
from period T when the economy is assumed to have converged to the new steady state.
Households are assumed to know the realization of the entire path of tangible asset prices
and rental rates. The value function in period T is the value function for the new steady
state. Then the value function in period T-1 is computed as follows:
VT￿1 (xT￿1jrT￿1;pT￿1) = max
cT;hT
[u(cT￿1;hT￿1) + ￿VT (xTjrT;pT)]
We simulate the model forward, starting from the capital stock and the joint distribution
of labor productivity and equity of the original steady state. In each period, we simulate a
cross-section of 10000 agents over 600 periods and aggregate their individual housing choices,
computing the excess demand for tangible assets in each period. We increase the rental rate
in periods with an excess demand in the market for tangible assets use, and decrease the
rental rate in periods with an excess supply, generating a new path frtg
T
t=1 of the rental




The stationary representation of the household￿ s problem
Using the property of the steady state equilibrium of Section 2.4, we normalize the
quantities and prices using the power function of labor in e¢ ciency units Mt ￿ AtNt and
population Nt. Both variables are exogenous state variables, and there can be a jump or a
kink in the trend if labor productivity experiences a once-for-all change in its level or growth
35rate. Let us denote the normalized variable Xt as e Xt. Then we have:
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We also de￿ne the normalized discount factor as:







Let us assume population grows along the steady state path. Let e At be deviation of labor
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Using these normalized variables, we can de￿ne the normalized value function. For an
example, the stationary representation of the retiree￿ s problem is (noting that prices and
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36Appendix C: Data sources and de￿nitions
To compute the share of income of productive tangible assets (￿); we use quarterly data
from the US Flow of Funds accounts and from the NIPA for the period of 1952 Q1 - 2005Q4.
We follow Cooley and Prescott (1995). We de￿ne unambiguous capital income as the sum of
corporate pro￿ts (￿); net interest (i); non-housing rental income (r) from the NIPA (table
1.12)20. We also measure the depreciation of capital (DEP) by the consumption of ￿xed
capital (NIPA, table 1.14). We allocate ￿ fraction of proprietors￿income (YP, NIPA, Table
1.12) to the income from productive tangible assets. Then, the income from productive tan-
gible assets, YZP; can be computed as the sum of unambiguous capital income, depreciation,
and ￿ fraction of proprietors￿income:
YZP = ￿ + i + r + DEP + ￿YP = ￿Y
where Y is GDP excluding explicit and implicit rents from housing. Solving this for ￿, we
have
￿ =
￿ + i + r + DEP
Y ￿ YP
This is a similar expression for the share of capital in output found in Cooley and Prescott
(1995, p.19).
Averaging the quarterly data for the U.S. from 1952 to 2005, we obtain a value of ￿ equal
to 0.26. This is lower than the share of capital in output in the real business cycle literature
(estimates there range between 0.3 and 0.4) because our ￿ excludes the capital intensive
production of housing services. We can decompose economy-wide tangible assets between
the household and the ￿rm. The exact de￿nitions in the data and their counterparts in the
theoretical model are given in the following table:
20We use the average share of residential to total structures to compute non-housing rental income from
the total rental payments of all persons reported in NIPA table 1.12.
37Economic
concept
Flow of Funds concept
pZy
Non-farm, non-￿nancial tangible assets
(Non-residential tangible assets+Equipment+software+Inventories)






(Residential tangible assets+Equipment+software+Consumer durables)
Flow of funds, Table B.100
FL152010005.Q+FL115035023.Q
Non-corporate tangible assets include residential properties occupied by renters. There-
fore, this series (FL115035023.Q) is subtracted from pZy and added to household tangible
assets. Using these de￿nitions, we compute the average numbers of ZY=(ZY + H) = 0:59
between 1952:Q1 and 2005:Q4. The ratio of total tangible assets to GDP (p(Zy + H)=Y )
is 3:3, giving an average value of residential tangible assets to GDP of around 1:94. If farm
corporate and non-corporate tangible assets (FL132010005.Q in the Flow of Funds)21 are
added to the non-farm tangible assets, then the ratio of household tangible assets to total
tangible assets falls from 0:59 to 0:55, while the ratio of total tangible assets to GDP rises
from 3:3 to 3:6.
Appendix D: Survey of Consumer Finances
We use primarily the 1992 SCF to calibrate our parameters. The labor income process is
intended to use entrepreneurial income on top of wages and salaries. Following Castaneda et.
al. (2003) we add to wages and salaries and proportion of proprietors￿income that can be at-
tributed to self-employment. Thus, total labor income is wages and salaries plus 0.93 of busi-
ness income where the 0.93 comes fromthe average ratio of (wages_sal/(wages_sal+bus_inc)).
Net worth is total assets minus total debt for each household, corresponding to variable s in
the model. The house value is the self-reported value of the primary residence conditional
21Thanks to Michael Palumbo (Board of Governors) of kindly sending us this series in private correspon-
dence.
38on owning a house. The SCF homeownership rate matches the Census one in 1992 exactly
(64%).
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Transition Dynamics from a 1% decrease in the world real interest rate
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Data
ModelTable 1: Distribution of earnings, net worth and house value – SCF 1992 
Earnings quintiles (all) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Data 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.23 0.62
Model 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.23 0.62
Net worth quintiles (all)
Data 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.80
Model 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.88
Net Worth quintiles (Homeowners)
Data 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.18 0.62
Model 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.78
House value quintiles (Homeowners)
Data 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.23 0.41
Model 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.21 0.62  
Notes to Table 1: Distribution of earnings, net worth and house value conditional on homeownership. The 
parameters of the earnings process are picked to match the observed distribution of earnings. Data refers to 




Table 2: Aggregate and Life cycle profiles of net worth and home-ownership  
SCF 1992 versus baseline model 
Table 2: Panel A 
Tenant Total Owner House House Value 
NW NW NW Value to NW
Data 0.68 3.29 4.76 1.93 1.39
Mode 0.01 3.29 5.52 2.34 1.49  
 
Table 2: Panel B 
Age Home-ownership
Data Model




65 or more 77% 90%  
 
Table 2: Panel C 
Net Worth (all) Net Worth (Owners) Home Size (Owners)
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Up to 34 0.80 0.21 1.62 0.68 1.60 1.00
35-44 2.35 1.23 3.34 2.26 2.02 1.62
45-54 4.72 2.65 5.91 3.88 2.24 2.17
55-64 5.98 4.34 7.27 5.58 2.11 2.69
65 or more 3.76 3.01 4.49 3.48 1.62 1.02  
Notes to Table 2: Data in Panels A and C are from the 1992 SCF, and data in panel B are from the Census, 
while model refers to the baseline capturing the initial steady state for the U.S.. In Panel A NW stands for 
net worth, and all numbers are the means relative to per capita GDP. Housing refers to the value of the 
home, while the house value to NW ratio is the median size of a house divided by net worth conditional on 
being a home-owner. Panel B reports the average homeownership over the life cycle. Panel C reports the 
average net worth over the life cycle (both for everyone and conditional on home-ownership), as well as the 
average home size over the life cycle (for homeowners).  
  
 
Table 3: Steady state comparative statics for the small open economy 
Panel A: US calibration
baseline θ=0.1 θ=1.0 ga=1.03 R*=5.69
 % of tenants 35.92 10.08 53.99 49.66 49.66
 % of constrained households 13.92 26.32 4.25 2.06 1.14
 % of unconstrained homeowners 50.16 63.61 41.77 48.28 49.21
 % of housing used by tenants 7.02 1.82 13.20 10.82 10.15
 % of housing used by constrained 2.97 5.11 2.92 0.84 0.37
 % of shares owned by tenants 0.10 0.01 0.71 0.18 0.13
 % of shares owned by constrained 0.26 0.23 1.29 0.17 0.06
Value of total tangible assets to GDP 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.62 3.75
Housing to total tangible assets 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.43
Value of housing to wages 2.39 2.40 2.39 2.50 2.61
Housing price to rental rate 8.58 8.58 8.58 9.56 9.87
Real return 6.69 6.69 6.69 6.69 5.69
Panel B: UK calibration
 % of tenants 31.87 7.51 54.18 49.66 49.62
 % of constrained households 15.63 22.82 5.21 1.51 1.25
 % of unconstrained homeowners 52.50 69.67 40.61 48.83 49.13
 % of housing used by tenants 5.92 1.26 12.67 10.44 10.27
 % of housing used by constrained 3.13 4.17 3.72 0.70 0.64
 % of shares owned by tenants 0.09 0.02 0.79 0.19 0.02
 % of shares owned by constrained 0.29 0.19 1.70 0.18 0.12
Value of total tangible assets to GDP 4.29 4.29 4.29 4.91 5.07
Housing to total tangible assets 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.44
Value of housing to wages 3.23 3.23 3.23 3.48 3.64
Housing price to rental rate 10.96 10.96 10.96 12.85 13.22
Real return 6.69 6.69 6.69 6.69 5.69  
Notes to Table 3: Results from the small open economy with a given demand for domestic shares by a 
representative foreigner (world interest rate is 6.69% equal to what would be the equilibrium interest rate in 
the US calibration when solved as a closed economy). In the baseline economy, the collateral constraint is 
denoted by θ and is equal to 0.2, population growth is one percent per annum and we have an annual 
productivity growth of two percent. Panel A compares steady states keeping γ=0.9, a value capturing the 
constraint imposed by land as representative of the U.S. economy. In the U.K. we view the land constraint 
as more binding and therefore reflected in the higher average value of total structures to GDP since 1987 
(4.29). Keeping all other parameters in the calibration the same to facilitate a comparison across economies 
with different γ, we find that a γ=0.78, with a slightly different utility discount for being a renter and a 
slightly different discount factor to maintain the same world interest rate, can produce a 32% tenancy rate 









Table 4: Wealth and Welfare Changes in response to exogenous shocks to 
fundamentals 
Scarcity of Land Parameter γ=0.9 γ=0.78 γ=0.9 γ=0.78 γ=0.9 γ=0.78
Column 123 4 5 6
Panel A: Certainty expenditure equivalent ga+1% ga+1% R*-1% R*-1% all all
Workers 8.04 9.32 -0.31 -0.02 10.56 12.74
Tenant Workers 8.35 9.17 1.29 0.96 9.84 10.44
Constrained Homeowner Workers 8.65 9.55 1.18 1.06 10.55 11.59
Unconstrained Homeowner Workers 8.84 10.35 -0.68 -0.14 12.12 15.33
Low Income Workers 8.37 9.32 1.31 1.00 9.92 10.79
Middle Income Workers 9.72 10.75 0.67 0.89 12.66 15.13
High Income Workers 8.74 11.06 -1.48 -0.24 12.74 17.45
Retirees 8.73 10.65 2.19 3.84 15.37 21.57
Tenant Retirees 6.65 6.92 1.37 0.68 8.28 8.25
Constrained Homeowner Retirees 6.46 7.12 1.28 1.14 8.87 9.24
Unconstrained Homeowner Retirees 11.38 11.16 2.44 4.31 16.18 22.25
Panel B: Wealth change
Workers 3.56 6.38 3.66 7.21 14.03 22.92
Tenant Workers 0.42 0.84 0.45 0.91 1.32 2.62
Constrained Homeowner Workers 2.46 4.54 1.99 4.38 6.07 12.52
Unconstrained Homeowner Workers 7.77 11.78 7.89 12.88 26.19 38.67
Low Income Workers 0.60 1.66 0.68 1.93 2.12 5.54
Middle Income Workers 7.88 12.13 8.12 13.22 24.79 38.11
High Income Workers 8.68 13.68 8.93 14.98 30.17 45.24
Retirees 6.47 10.50 6.63 11.57 21.78 34.16
Tenant Retirees 0.71 1.62 0.44 1.64 1.38 3.70
Constrained Homeowner Retirees 3.03 4.54 2.39 4.61 6.31 9.63
Unconstrained Homeowner Retirees 10.48 11.24 7.32 12.28 23.27 35.74  
Notes to Table 4: Welfare (expenditure certainty equivalent calculations) and wealth changes for 
economies with different γ after a 1% permanent productivity increase (ga), a reduction in the world 
interest rate by 1% (R*) and a combination of these two shocks along with a financial liberalization that 
reduces the collateral constraint from 0.2 to 0.1. Details of calculating the transition and the exact welfare 
measures are given in the text. 